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I. Introduction
The decision in December 1984 by the Commission of the European
Communities in the John Deere case' (the Decision) is a good example of a
common problem confronting multinational corporate counsel active in
Europe. A quick reading might lead to the conclusion that the case simply
deals with a violation of Article 85(1) of the Rome Treaty,2 since Deere and
Company was found guilty of having imposed on its dealers and distributors,
bans on the exports of John Deere agricultural machinery products to other
member States within the EEC. It is well-known that the free flow of goods
within the EEC may not be constrained,3 and it is also known that the
Commission imposed substantial fines for violations of this, the most sacred
of EEC commandments. 4
Why then is the John Deere case of particular interest? Corporate counsel
*A.B. Harvard College (1962); J.D. University of Michigan Law School (1965); Dr. Jur.
University of Heidelberg, Germany; Counsel, European and Japanese Regions, Eastman
Kodak Company, Rochester, New York.
1. John Deere, Comm'n Dec. of 14 Dec. 1984, 85/79, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
10,652.
2. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11.
3. Miller International Schallplatten GmbH v. EEC Commission; 19/77 [1978]; COMMON
MKcr. REP. (CCH) 8439. BMW Belgium et al. v. EEC Commission; 32/78 and 36-82/78 [1979];
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8548. Kawasaki; Commission Decision of December 12, 1978;
COMMON MKr. REP. (CCH) 10,097. Pioneer Electronic Europe NV; Commission Decision of
December 14, 1979; COMMON MiT. REP. (CCH) 10,185. Johnson & Johnson Inc.; Commis-
sion Decision of November 25, 1980; COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,227.
4. 2 B. HAWK, United States, Common Market and International Antitrust (2d ed. 1985)
118-121. U. TOEPKE, EEC COMPETITION LAW (1982) 445-473. For recent Commission decisions
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reading the Decision cannot help but be struck by references to written
opinions from Deere's own in-house counsel, such as: "Deere and Company
knew that such conduct and, in particular, the contractual export ban, was
contrary to EEC and national competition law. It was advised on this by its
in-house counsel.",5 Such comments about in-house counsel, in a case in-
volving serious misconduct and high fines, provokes reflection about in-
house counselling activities in Europe and how the same might later be
construed by the Commission against the corporate client and employee.
II. EEC Commission and
the Decision Process
In order to appreciate fully the seriousness of the problem, one must
understand that the Commission is the executive body of the EEC and one
of its purposes is the enforcement of the EEC competition laws embodied in
Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty.6 In typical continental European
on market partitioning, see EEC COMMISSION, FOURTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY,
62-66 (1985).
5. John Deere, supra note 1, at point 21.
6. Article 85: The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all
agreements between undertakings, decision by associations of Member States and which have
as their object of effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the
common market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices on any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have
no connection with the subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically
void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of:
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit,
and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to
the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a
substantial part of the products in question.
Article 86: Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the
common market insofar as it may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
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fashion, the administrative enforcement procedure is inquisitional and not
adversarial. 7 The Commission is, in the first place, an investigating body
with broad powers. It can go so far as to conduct unannounced on-the-spot
investigations (euphemistically known as "dawn raids") on unsuspecting
companies for the purpose of obtaining damaging documents. After the
investigation stage it is again the Commission which files a complaint, or
"Statement of Objections," against the alleged offender. Thereafter the
accused is invited to a brief hearing (brief by U.S. standards), which is again
before the Commission. After the hearing, the Commission is free to render
a decision, which can include the imposition of very high fines, cease and
desist orders, and injunctions.8 It is sometimes said that the Commission is
the investigator, prosecutor, judge and jury, all in one.
III. In-house Legal Advice
and Privilege in the EEC
A. THE DEERE CASE
1. Background
Mindful of the Commission's broad function and powers, a closer look at
the John Deere Decision is most revealing. On September 3, 1982 the
National Farmers Union in the United Kingdom complained to the Com-
mission that Deere's independent dealer in Belgium had refused to supply a
tractor to one of its members. Six weeks later, on October 14, Commission
inspectors visited the Belgian dealer and a month thereafter, on November
18 and 19, they conducted an investigation at the Deere and Company
European Offices in Mannheim, Federal Republic of Germany, from which
they took copies of about 150 documents relating to "over the border sales."
One should note the speed with which the Commission can act; in less than
three months from the time the National Farmers Union complained, it
visited two locations and obtained copies of approximately 150 documents
on which to base. its case.
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair
trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of con-
sumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have
no connection with the subject of such contracts.
298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47-48.
7. TOEPKE, supra note 3, at 686.
8. Van Bael, A Practitioner's Guide to Due Process in EEC Antitrust and Antidumping
Proceedings, 18 INT'L LAW. 841, (1984). Hawk, supra note 3, at 16-29.
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Over the course of the next nine months, the Commission evidently
analyzed the documents so gathered, and on August 12, 1983 it filed a
Statement of Objections. In October 1983 both Deere and the dealers
submitted written responses to the Statement of Objections without asking
for a hearing. 9 Five months later, in March 1984, the Commission made
available the quotations from the 150 documents on which it might base its
Decision. Deere commented on those quotations, apparently without being
able to reverse the Commission's interpretation. On December 17, 1984,
the Commission adopted a Decision, holding that article 85(1) was violated
and that Deere and Company be fined 2,000,000 European Currency Unit
(ECU).
2. The Case and Decision
Given such a procedure, it is particularly disturbing to learn that in-house
legal opinions were used to the considerable detriment of the company.
Even with the benefit of hindsight, it does not appear that the legal depart-
ment rendered bad advice or acted in an unprofessional manner. Instead, it
acted quite normally and reasonably in the performance of its duties,
although today one might say that the advice should have been spoken and
not written.
There were two relevant issues on which the legal department gave
written advice in the Deere case. First, it appears that the in-house lawyers
wrote opinions to European, and U.S. managers to the effect that efforts to
constrain parallel exports and, in particular, a contractual export ban, were
contrary to EEC and national competition laws. Since 1967 when Deere first
imposed such export bans, European law against impeding the free flow of
goods within the EEC developed substantially ° and, therefore, it is only
natural for the legal department to follow such developments and to advise
management accordingly. This effort, however, backfired. The Commission
reviewed the in-house legal opinions and concluded as follows: "Deere
acted intentionally. There was knowledge of the pressure for parallel trad-
ing, knowledge of its policy to prevent this trading, and of the doubtful
legality of many of the steps taken in order to prevent it throughout the
Deere group within the Community .... 11 In fixing the fine, the Commission
takes into account whether the violation was intentional. The in-house legal
opinion made it easier to find intentional misconduct, thus justifying a
higher fine.
The second issue on which the legal department opined is more complex.
9. Van Bael, supra note 6, at 849 for defense counsel's opinion as to hearings in general.
10. Toepke, supra note 3, at 471-472.
11. John Deere, supra note 1, at point 39.
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In 1972 Deere management, apparently aware of the legal risk surrounding
contractual export prohibitions, must have thought that a qualifying clause
attached to the export ban might give protection from liability. The clause
put into the German sales conditions reads as follows: "The purchaser
undertakes, as far as no contrary legal regulation prevents, not to resell
articles . . . abroad with or without modification either directly or
indirectly.",12 [emphasis added]
Presumably, Deere argued in its defense that the contractual export ban
was only effective if permitted by law, and since EEC law proscribed export
prohibitions within the EEC, the export prohibition clause did not apply to
goods flowing across national borders within the EEC. The Commission did
not spend much time analzying the restraint of exports, but instead took the
easy way out. It simply dismissed Deere's defense by saying that this
particular provision constitutes an export ban in spite of the savings clause,
since a dealer signing the agreement is generally small and thus not likely to
consult a lawyer. Then, the Commission gave Deere's defense the knock-
out punch with the following words: "Deere's own in-house counsel ex-
pressed doubts as to the legitimacy of such a device."13
One cannot help but be sympathetic to the plight of the Deere and
Company legal department. It seems that the in-house lawyers made a
valiant effort to advise their client on complex and rapidly developing points
of EEC law, which advice management can find difficult and expensive to
accept. To have this opinion used afterwards as an admission against the
interest of their client/employer, must have been painful indeed. How can it
be that good advice by in-house counsel can later serve as ammunition for
the Commission?
B. THE RELATED AM&S JUDGMENT
On May 18, 1982, a mere three and one-half months before the National
Farmers Union complained to the Commission about Deere and Company,
the European Court of Justice handed down a landmark decision with
respect to attorney-client privilege as it relates to the investigative powers of
the Commission. It is this case which affirmed the Commission's power to
obtain and use as evidence certain types of legal documents and, as we have
seen, the Commission wasted no time in employing that power against
Deere and Company.
12. Id. at point 16.
13. Id. at point 27.
SPRING 1986
682 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
1. Background
Much has been said and written about the Court of Justice opinion in
AM&S Europe Limited v. Commission,'4 but it might nevertheless be
worthwhile to analyze the implications of the case from the perspective of
international corporate counsel. During the course of an investigation by
the Commission of the U.K. company AM&S Europe Limited, the com-
pany refused to produce certain documents for inspection. Pursuant to the
power granted the Commission by regulation 17, article 14(3), the Commis-
sion took a formal Decision which ordered, in part, the production for
examination of ". . . all documents for which legal privilege is claimed.
•.. 15 It is important to recall what was said earlier about the power of the
Commission, namely that in the final analysis it is investigator, prosecutor,
judge and jury. With respect to the documents for which AM&S claimed
privilege, the Commission essentially ordered that it must first look at the
documents and then, as "judge," rule on the question of privilege to
determine whether it, the Commission, can use the same documents as
evidence in its capacity as investigator and prosecutor. Or, to put it another
way, the Commission must see the entire document first, in order to rule as a
matter of law, whether it may see it.
16
The basic problem of the AM&S case is due to the fact that the Council of
Ministers, i.e., the legislative body of the Community, gave broad investiga-
tive powers to the Commission in regulation 17, but remained silent on the
question of legal privilege. AM&S, therefore, had very little choice but to
claim that the national laws of the member States, in one form or another,
recognize the concept of legal privilege and that this protection should. also
be available in proceedings before the Commission.
The Commission, on the other hand, maintained that it had been given
broad powers to investigate, and that only the Commission had the right to
determine what documents would be protected. The Court's task was a
difficult one, since it clearly wanted to give some type of protection to
attorney-client communications and yet there was no firm foundation in
Community law on which to base such a holding. At one point in the
Opinion, the Court reveals its frustration by saying that the problem arises
"from the omission to date by the Commission to exercise its power of
initiative and to propose a regulation providing, in a manner that conforms
to the law of the Community, for a procedure for use in these cases.'1 7 The
14. AM&S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, 155/79, [1982] E. COMM. CT. J. REP. 1575, COMMON
Mr. REP. (CCH) 8757.
15. Id.
16. Toepke, supra note 3, at 700.
17. AM&S Europe Ltd., supra note 14.
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Commission, however, always seemed quite content with its unrestricted
power under regulation 17, and demonstrated no inclination to propose new
legislation to the Council to limit its own investigative authority.
2. The Court's Decision
In spite of this difficulty, the Court did make some progress on the issue of
legal privilege. The Court held as follows:
(a) The Commission's investigative power is subject to a restriction
imposed by the need to protect confidentiality. This confidentiality is
premised on the condition that such communications are made for the
purposes and in the interests of the clients' right of defense and that
they emanate from independent lawyers, i.e., lawyers who are not
bound to the client by a relationship of employment.
(b) This protection applies without distinction to any independent lawyer
entitled to practice his profession in one of the member States regard-
less of the member State in which the client lives. However, the
protection may not be extended beyond those limits.
(c) The party refusing to produce a particular document bears the burden
of proving to the Commission that the document is protected by
privilege. The respondent is not obliged to reveal the entire contents
of the document in order to meet this burden of proof. If the inspector
is not satisfied with the proof so given, it is for the Commission to
order by Decision the production of the document in question. Such a
Decision to produce is then subject to review by the Court of Justice
under article 173 of the Rome Treaty.
In sum, EEC lawyers in private practice have legal privilege, while
in-house counsel and non-EEC lawyers are left out in the cold. Fur-
thermore, a respondent does not have to reveal the entire document to the
Commission to meet the burden of proof on the question of privilege, and
the Court of Justice is available to resolve any resulting disputes.
C. COMMISSION'S POSITION
ON IN-HOUSE LAWYERS
Parenthetically, it is curious to observe how the Commission views the
role of the in-house legal advisor. In its Twelfth Report on Competition
Policy, the Commission seems quite content with the AM&S ruling, depriv-
ing in-house counsel communications of legal privilege. Only independent
lawyers deserve this privilege since:
... the requirement as to position and status as an independent lawyer is based on
a conception of the lawyer's role as collaborating in the administration of justice.
The counterpart of that protection lies in the rules of professional ethics and
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discipline which are laid down and enforced in the general interest by institutions
endowed with the requisite powers for that purpose. 
18
However, the Commission's view of in-house counsel changes drastically
when it comes to the issue of a company's right to be assisted by legal
advisors during an on-the-spot investigation, that is, during a "dawn raid."
In the same Twelfth Report on Competition Policy, under the heading
"Procedures during inspections," the Commission says the following:
. . . during the inspection the undertaking may call in its legal advisers for
consultation. However, their presence is not a legal precondition for the validity of
the inspection, which must not be unduly delayed as a result. In all events, it is not
necessary to wait for a legal adviser where the undertaking concerned has in-house
lawyers. 9
The in-house counsel, therefore, is both a real lawyer and not a real
lawyer, depending on what happens to be convenient for the Commission.
The Commission's position on in-house counsel seems, in effect, to be,
"Heads I win, tails you lose."
IV. Reactions to the AM&S Judgment
Although voices strongly protesting the AM&S judgment were heard
throughout Europe, as well as in the United States, the degree of dissatisfac-
tion varied from country to country, depending on the manner in which the
respective national laws and traditions deal with the concept of legal priv-
ilege for in-house counsel. For example, in the U.K. and Ireland, in-house
barristers and solicitors are full-fledged members of the legal profession,
subject to the same rules of professional ethics and discipline as their
colleagues in private practice, including the rights and obligations pertaining
to legal privilege. In France, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, employed
lawyers are not members of the Bar and, therefore, their communications
are not protected. In Germany, house counsel may be members of the Bar,
but they may not represent or defend their employers in court. 20 It, there-
fore, came as no surprise when the loudest outcry against the AM&S ruling
was heard in the U.K. The Financial Times in June 1982 expressed its
displeasure as follows:
May 18 deserves to be marked with red letters in the diaries of EEC competition
lawyers in private practice. A judgment handed down by the European Court on
that day will go a long way to create for them a useful monoply and to eliminate
18. EEC Commission, Twelfth Report on Competition Policy (1982) at point 52.
19. Id. at point 32
20. Kreis, The AM&S Judgment of the European Court of Justice and its Consequences
within and outside The Community, 20 Swiss REV. INT'L ANTITRUST L. 3, 16 (1984).
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competition of in-house lawyers and of American and any other non-EEC lawyers
active in this lucrative branch of law.
21
In reaction to the AM&S judgment, the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association adopted two resolutions in February 1983 re-
questing the EEC Commission: (1) as a matter of comity, to grant the U.S.
lawyers the same legal privilege in the EEC as EEC lawyers are afforded
before the U.S. Courts and antitrust enforcement agencies; and (2) to study
and extend attorney-client privilege to house counsel whether of an EEC
Member State or otherwise.
22
V. Implications for In-House Lawyers and the
Availability of Legal Privilege
The criticisms levied at the AM&S judgment seem, for the most part, to
be based on concepts such as professional qualifications of the lawyer in
member States, professional ethics and discipline, international comity,
reciprocity, rights under bilateral treaties, prestige of the legal profession,
the client's right of defense, the manner in which the lawyer is paid, etc. But
no one has yet focused on the chilling effect this case has, and will continue
to have, on the communications and deliberations within multinational
corporations on matters of European competition law. Perhaps this omis-
sion is due to the fact that the experts on legal privilege do not have a
sufficient understanding of the modern multinational corporation, how it
communicates, deliberates and ultimately makes decisions.
A. ATrORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE IN HISTORY
This is not the place to engage in a deep philosophical debate on attorney-
client privilege, but one can nevertheless safely say that for several hundred
years in Western civilization, the privilege has been defended as providing
an important social benefit to society. 23 We have moved away from the
concept that the privilege exists to enhance the status of the lawyer and,
instead, we now focus on the importance to society of open and uninhibited
communications with legal advisors. 24 One of the basic underpinnings of
most legal systems, including the EEC, is the ancient axiom that everyone is
presumed to know the law, and it, therefore, follows that everyone can
ascertain the law by consulting a lawyer. It is also ancient wisdom that one
21. Financial Times (London) June 3, 1982, as quoted in Kreis, supra note 18, at 4.
22. See Kreis, supra note 18, at 10.
23. 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2290 at 542 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
24. Id. § 2291 at 545.
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must be able to make inquiries on legal matters without incurring any
danger. The communication must be privileged or else the inquiry will not
be made in the first place, which means that the law will remain a sealed
book. In that case, the presumption that everyone knows the law becomes
an absurdity and the very foundation of the legal system is called into
question.
If our Western legal systems have a tradition of encouraging and protect-
ing confidential communications with legal counsellors, it must be for the
very good reason that society benefits if its citizens have access to legal
advice without fear or concern. With legal privilege, society protects the
confidentiality of the communication itself, since without such confidential-
ity, our tradition tells us, the public at large will be most reluctant to learn
what it is that society demands through its laws.
B. IMPACT ON THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION
Multinational corporations make great efforts at high cost to obtain
expert legal advice in all the jurisdictions in which they operate. However,
the very complexity of multibillion dollar enterprises, with numerous prod-
ucts and services marketed and manufactured by tens or even hundreds of
thousands of people throughout the world, requires that the confidential
communication with legal counsel be conducted in a particular manner in
order that it may reach the right people at the appropriate decision-making
level and also be cost effective. Modern multinational corporations have,
therefore, engaged fully qualified lawyers to work in-house to provide this
legal service, since it is virtually impossible for outside counsel to perform
this function adequately.
What public purpose can, therefore, be served by granting legal privilege
to communications with outside lawyers and denying it with in-house
lawyers? What difference does it make to society whether the legal advisor is
on the company payroll and receives his check at the end of the month, or
whether his office bills the company by the hour or is on a retainer. The
important thing is that the company's decision makers know, in this highly
complex age, what it is that society, in various countries, expects of them.
Only the in-house lawyer, assisted of course by outside legal experts, can get
that advice to the right people within the company in a cost effective
manner. Does it, therefore, make sense to penalize a company through loss
of legal privilege if it selects this form of legal communication, because the
circumstances of modern multinational corporate life so demand?
The AM&S and John Deere cases have considerably choked off free and
uninhibited internal written discussions of a company's obligations and
liabilities under EEC competition law, and it seems that this state of affairs is
not only detrimental to the company itself, but also to society as a whole. As
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is suggested by the ABA resolution referenced earlier, the EEC authorities
should study carefully the consequences of their rulings and then ask the
question once again, whether from the point of view of general public
policy, it would not be more desirable for the legal privilege to be extended
also to in-house counsel communications, such as it is in the U.K., Ireland
and the United States.
C. PRIVATE DAMAGE AcTIoNs
IN NATIONAL COURTS
The Commission is obviously interested in achieving broad compliance
with competition laws, but it is not pursuing this objective by working
towards a more harmonious relationship between government and industry.
Rather, it seems to be encouraging private parties to bring damage actions in
the national courts for violations of Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty.25
A member of the Commission's Legal Service, Mr. John Temple Lang,
expressed this thought recently:
The Commission has an interest in encouraging actions in national courts to
enforce Articles 85 and 86, and indeed Community law generally. The Commis-
sion is short of staff, and has many important duties as well as enforcing Articles 85
and 86 in individual cases, some of which are of relatively little economic impor-
tance however vital they may be to those involved.
26
He goes on to encourage litigation in the national courts and indicates the
Commission might be of substantial assistance to plaintiffs. He further
suggests that one might first complain to the Commission in order to get
evidence for a subsequent private damage action in the national courts:
There may be cases in which the plaintiff's principal or sole reason for complaining
to the Commission rather than suing in a national court is the hope that the
Commission, by using its inspection powers, will obtain important evidence not
available under national discovery procedures. If the Commission obtains such
evidence, the question then arises whether the Commission must continue with its
own procedure even if national proceedings would otherwise be wholly satisfac-
tory, or whether the Commission may relieve itself of the case by giving the
evidence in question to the potential plaintiff so that it can use it in nation-
al proceedings.
27
Later in the same work, Mr. Lang discloses how he thinks the evidence
obtained by the Commission could be put to its best use: "It would obviously
be more economical if the Commission were free to make the evidence
25. See supra note 6.
26. Lang, EEC Competition Actions in Member State Courts-Claims for Damages, Declara-
tions and Injunctions for Breach of Community Antitrust Law, 1983 FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW
INSTITUTE 219, at 237 (B. Hawk ed.).
27. Id. at 270.
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available to the plaintiff." 28 If the John Deere experience is not sufficient to
strike fear into the hearts of multinational counsel, perhaps the prospect of
in-house counsel documents being introduced as evidence in the national
courts by private litigants, will provide some additional food for thought.
Private enforcement of Articles 85 and 86 is not yet a real problem in the
EEC, but that could change if a particular point of view among Commission
officials prevails.
VI. Conclusion
The Japanese experience in recent years has taught us in the West that
society can benefit substantially where a harmonious relationship between
government and industry exists. In the case of EEC competition laws, both
government and industry should make greater efforts to understand the
needs and concerns of the other. If that goal is indeed desirable, the
channels of communication must ensure that all ideas receive adequate
consideration. In-house counsel is an important link in that communications
process, and it would be counterproductive if that link were weakened, or
even broken, because the EEC legal community is unable to agree on
certain esoteric theories underlying the principle of legal privilege.
28. Id. at 272.
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